The link between money and prices : 1971-76 by Denis S. Karnosky
HAT group which gathers under the banner of
monetarism has long blamed excessive monetary ex-
pansion as the source of inflation. They have argued
that inflation, as a persistent increase in the general
price level, results solely from a maintained expansion
of the money stock at rates in excess of increases in
the amount of money demanded in the economy.
The validity of this view, or at least its usefulness,
rests on the issue of whether or not its predictions are
consistent with the evidence.l The purpose of this
exercise is to subject the money-price hypothesis to a
test, using the experience of the past five years for
evidence. This period is particularly useful in this
context since it was unique in the number and mag-
nitude of nonmonetary shocks to the economy. Price
controls, devaluations, agricultural problems, new gov-
ernment regulations, the actions of OPEC (Organiza-
tion of Petroleum Exporting Countries) and disappear-
ing anchovies, among others, worked on the pattern of
prices. The question is how these factors fit, if at all,
in the money-price hypothesis and how well the
hypothesis “performs” in such an environment.
The Money-Price Connection
The notion that inflation is a monetary process is
based on the conception of “money” as that asset
which minimizes transaction costs in the economy.
The cost of the services derived from any money
holdings, like that of other assets, are consumption
opportunities that are foregone as long as the money
is held in inventory. In this sense the price of money
is the inverse of the general price index, properly
weighted to include the prices of all consumption
opportunities, current and futnre.2 This view implies
that disequilibrium in the market for money, with a
given stock, can be eliminated only through a change
in the general level of prices or the emergence of
some force that works to shift the demand for money
to equate the amount demanded to the stock supplied,
at existing prices.
A fundamental tenet of what has come to be called
the monetarist position is that the second situation is
not likely, in the sense that disequilibrium in the
market for money does not set into motion forces in
other areas of the economy which then work to shift
the demand for money, with little or no change in the
existing price level. Similarly, this position denies the
possibility of factors outside of the market for money
generating a permanent change in the rate of infla-
tion, without creating a situation of permanent excess
money supply. Thus inflation, as a continuing increase
2
The general price level thus is Snore extensive than is ac-
counted for by current price indexes, which typically include
prices of output, but ignore the prices of existing assets. This
raises very interesting questions for the issue at hand, but
they will he ignored — in the spirit of commonly practiced
macroeconosnic analysis. See Armen A. Alchian and Ben-
jamin Klein, “On a Correct Measure of Inflation,” Journal of
Money, Credit and Banking, February 1973, pp. 173-91.
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1Recently, Michael Levy attempted to provide evidence to
refute the money-price h’nkage by showing that other vari-
ables, such as unit labor costs, capacity utilization rates, and
measures of inflation severity and sensitivity, “explain” prices
better than does money. Levy’s effort falls far short, however,
in that his tests were based on a basic misrepresentation of
the theory which says inflation is a monetary phenomenon.
The analysis presented here is addressed to this misconception
and attempts to point out how much can be gleaned from the
popular “evidence.” See Michael F. Levy, “constraining
Inflation: Concerns, Complacencies, and the Evidence,” The
Conference Board Record, National Industrial Conference
Board, Washington, D.C., October 1975, pp. 8-14. For a
similar aualysis and a critical discussion, see Peter Fortune,
‘An Evahsation of Anti-Inflation Policies in the United
States” and “comment” by William Poole in Federal Reserve
Bank of Boston, New England Economic Review (January/
February 1974), pp. 3-34.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS JUNE 1976
in the general level of prices, is a manifestation solely
of a persistent excess of money supplied at existing
prices, and the money supply, in turn, is the result of
actions by the monetary authorities.
Empirically, this argument implies that the rate of
change of prices can be expressed as a function of
the rate of change of the money stock. With some re-
gard for lags in adjustment, an equation of the follow-
ing form is implied:
n
(1) AmP = a0 + cxaw1AmnM1 + ~
where a0
= 0 and a1 ~w5
= 1.0, and ii demonstrates all
of the usual nice properties. This equation says- only
that the fundamental rate of inflation is reflective of
the long-term rate of monetary expansion. The ex-
clusion of nonmonetary factors from the equation
reflects the view that these factors can have only a
temporary effect on the rate of change of prices)~The
equation has been estimated for the period 1/1954 -
1/1976, with n = 20. Prices are measured by the
GNP deflator and the money stock is taken to be
composed of currency in the hands of the public plus
private demand deposits. The fit is shown in Chart I.
The explanatory power of the regression is reasonably
good through most of the sample period, with the
glaring exception of 1971-74. The errors in this period
are the point of interest in this paper.
The period since mid-1971 is rather unique in the
postwar period and offers a rare opportunity to test
the money-price connection in that so many factors
were working to disturb the relationship. Coinprehen-
sive price controls were introduced in August of
1971, and fiddled with over the next two and a half
years. The formal arrangements on international ex-
change rates and payments collapsed under the pres-
3
1t is important to keep in mind that equation (1) is not
intended to ‘explain” each and every wiggle in the rate of
change of prices, hut instead is a short-hand description of
the fundamental inflation process. As such, it does not in-
clude those factors which have a temporary or short-run
impact on the rate of price change. While this caveat might
give the impression of defining away the problem, it is in-
tended only to forestall arguments to the effect that some
other price equation, based perhaps on measures of wages,
productivity, and utilization rates, better “explains” the price
data and thus is a better representation of the inflation proc-
ess. These altematives typically are structural equations, with
endogenous variables on the right-hand side. Equation (1) is
offered as a reduced form, where several potential exogenous
shift variables have been excluded. As such, it is not offered
in competition with stmctural price equations. In fact, it can
be shown that models which incorporate the standard type of
price equation can yield equation (1) in their reduced form.
Leonall C. Andersen and Denis S. Karnosky, “A Monetary
Interpretation of Inflation” (a paper presented to the Confer-
ence on Price Behavior, National Bureau of Economic Re-
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sure of diverse national economic policies. The agri-
cultural sector was buffeted by price controls and
massive and unexpected foreign demand. Finally, the
oil embargo, the increase in the price of petroleum,
and the government’s programs aimed at the energy
situation worked to increase the price of energy
dramatically.
It is not sufficient to investigate the validity of the
money-price hypothesis on the basis of the predictive
power of equation (1) for a period like 1971-74, for
the equation is specified on the presumption that
other autonomous factors had no significant impact
on the rate of change of prices during the sample
period. Obviously, this was not the case over the
past five years. The Durbin-Watson statistic
(D. W. = 1.131) is indicative of an omitted-variable
problem in the 1954-76 sample period. However,
when equation (1) is run over the period 1/1954 -
11/1971 (Chart I), there is little indication of serial
correlation (D. W. = 1.729). This suggests that, while
equation (1) might have been a reasonable proposi-
tion, something caused it to go wrong in the 1971-74
period. The evidence suggests that nonmonetary fac-
tors were influencing the rate of inflation in this
period.
The relevant point is not that nonmonetary factors
affected the price level; instead, the focus is on the
manner in which such influences are held to operate
in the monetarist framework. In summary, the mone-
tary explanation of inflation views these factors as
being incapable of exerting a lasting influence on the
rate of change of the general price level. Some factors,
(PJ~
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however, are capable of affecting permanently the
level of prices.
The various factors which have arisen since 1971
can be divided into two general categories: (A)
those that temporarily affect the price level, relative
to that consistent with monetary conditions, and (B)
those that permanently displace the price level.
Referring to Chart II, Case (A) is descriptive of the
monetarist handling of the effects of a shock like
general price controls, instituted at t, and maintained
until t
1
, where the interval t
1
- t
0 is “reasonably” short.
The duration of the control program is important be-
cause there is no doubt that differential price controls,
if maintained for a long period of time or, at least,
announced to be long-lasting, can be expected to af-
fect in a fundamental way the allocation of resources
within the economy. The consumption-investment pat-
tern probably would be affected, and with it, wealth,
and therefore the demand for real money balances.
With an unchanged money stock, or a constant rate of
increase, desired and actual real balances xvould be
equated by a change in the general level of prices,
but probably upward.~
In Case (A), the price level is temporarily dis-
placed from that consistent with monetary conditions
(P). Since price controls typically are aimed at
those prices which are included in the price indexes,
the data will show a noticeable deceleration of price
change during the period that controls are in place
4
0n a more pedestrian level, the shift in resources between
markets would destroy whatever smali validity there remains of






5 Once the controls are removed, however,
prices adjust upward to the level dictated by the
monetary situation, and the observed rate of change
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are not sufficient to refute the money-price linkage.
In fact, such an occurrence could be construed as
offering evidence in support of the theory which
yields equation (1), if the price level returns to the
path dictated by the rate of monetary expansion.
Case (B) is somewhat more complicated, but then
it is also more interesting. This situation is descriptive
of the manner in which the monetarist framework
views the impact of cost-push factors — autonomous
decreases in aggregate supply resulting from non-
market increases in factor prices, maintained by in-
creased unemployment of those factors. For many
years concern has been directed at labor as the prime
source of such pressure, hut the evidence has been far
from conclusive on the willingness of labor to under-
take such a policy.~~ OPEC has been quite generous,
however, in creating a situation which comes as close
to a laboratory experiment on this issue as economists
could ever hope for.
The significant increase in the price of energy which
has resulted since the oil embargo of late 1973 repre-
sents exactly the type of pressure typically identified
with cost-push inflation. The oil price increase repre-
sents an unexpected and substantial rise in the cost
of production across a large segment of the economy
and, as such, results in a decrease in the productive
capacity of the economy. Many processes now in
place, implemented with some expectation of absolute
5
Withess the remarks of James \V, MacLane, Deputy Director
of the Cost of Living Council under the Nixon administra-
tion: “These two items, beef and oil, have a large impact on
the overall Consumer Price Index, and that is wily we are
keeping the price freeze on beef until September 12, and
keeping a price ceiling on gasoline.” New York Journal of
Commerce, July 31, 1973.
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5
1t is irrelevant that labor might act on the supposition that
the monetary authorities will validate wage increases in ex-
cess of productivity gains, hoping thereby to avoid the in-
crease in unemployment. That is a policy decision, reflected
in the relative weight given to unemployment in the policy
deliberations of the monetary authorities. Even though the
money supply would then appear to be endogenous, relative
to the wage rate, the fact remains that the monetarist position
holds that in the absence of the increased rate of money
growth, the rate of change in the general price level will not
be affected in a permanent way by the increase in factor prices.
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and relative factor prices, are made obsolete by the
uuexpected increase in energy prices. The effect is
exactly that which would be associated with an auton-
omous rise in wage rates above that justified by in-
creased productivity. With aggregate demand un-
changed, an increase in the level of prices and a
decrease in the rate of production would result.
So long as OPEC is willing to tolerate the reduced
rate of oil production that their price actions cause,
the wealth of the United States and others is per-
manently decreased. One manifestation of this wealth
loss is a one-shot decrease in the demand for real
money balances. With the money stock unchanged, or
growing at the prior trend rate, equilibrium in the
market for money is restored by a one-shot increase in
the general price level. During the interval of this ad-
justment (t.
0
- t,) the rate of change of prices will be
seen to rise above the rate consistent with the rate of
money growth. However, once the price level has ad-
justed, the rate of change of prices would return to
the fundamental inflation rate consistent with the rate
of monetary expansion.
Through this period of adjustment the rate of price
change would exceed that predicted by the rate of
money growth. But, as in Case (A), care must be
taken in viewing this experience as evidence contrary
to the monetarist position. The monetary hypothesis
says that nonmonetary factors can have only tem-
porary effects on the rate of inflation, not that they
can have no effect at all. The key to analysis of a
situation like the change in energy prices is the be-
havior of the rate of price change after the adjustment
to the initial shock. The monetarist position holds that,
for a particular rate of money growth, the price level
that results will be a constant proportion (I + p) of
that consistent with the rate of monetary expansion.
This is shown in the lower-right panel of Chart II,
where, after adjustment at (t
4
), the new price level
increases at tbe same rate and thus runs parallel to P~.
Such a prediction is in direct contrast to that
yielded by the more common view of cost-push infla-
tion where an autonomous nonmonetary shock to ag-
gregate supply is sufficient to set off a wage-price
spiral which feeds on itself, independent of monetary
developments.7 It is not appropriate to hedge this
~Levy, for example, goes so far as to conclude that monetary
actions have little direct influence on the rate of inflation, once
factors such as unit labor costs, capacity utilization rates, and
expectations are accounted for. In the context of his analysis,
an increase in wages above gains in productivity raises unit
labor costs and then prices. Such action then is sufficient to
increase the rate of inflation pennanently, with no recourse
to whether or not the monetary authorities expand the money
stock in response. See Levy, p. 12.
position in the current context, on the observation
that the substantial rise in unemployment since mid-
1974 has muted somewhat the thrust of the wage-
price spiral. That point is, after all, an element of the
alternative hypothesis — namely that autonomous
increases in prices above market clearing levels can
be maintained only throngh the acquiescence of the
unemployed.
A Look at the Evidence
How well does equation (1) hold up in the face of
the numerous nonmonetary shocks which have beset
the economy since 1971? A preliminary indication is
given by the predictions of equation (1) estimated
from a sample ending in mid-1971 and simulated over
the period 111/1971 - 1/1976 using the actual pattern
of money growth. This simulation, shown in Chart III,
yields errors in the 1971-76 period similar to the re-
gression errors for the same period, which are pre-
sented in Chart I. The rate of price change is oven’-
estimated through 1972 and underestimated in
1973-74. The prediction errors since 1974 are more in
line with the regression residuals in the 1954-71 sam-
ple period. The errors resemble generally the cases
shown in the upper panels of Chart II, where the
economy moves sequentially through Cases A and B.
But what of the price level? Using the actual level
of the CNP deflator in 11/1971 as the base, the price
level implied by the simulation of equation (1) can
be computed by accumulating the predicted rates of
change, The results are presented in Chart I\~and
CIte SI
Ex ante Simulation of Equation (1)
lamp), p’4001 1/1954 - 11/1970
Act,a] 0l,M 9,, 111/1971 - 0/0976
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are compared to the reported index. The predicted
price level is above the reported deflator through
1973 and below thereafter.
The significant observation, however, is the behav-
ior of the price level since 1974. The reported price
index through the year runs almost parallel to that
predicted by equation (1), averaging about 4.5 per-
cent higher. This observation is consistent with the
prediction that the various nonmonetary factors (with
the union of government regulations and OPEC pre-
eminent) that have worked to increase costs of pro-
duction since mid-1971 have caused a one-time de-
crease in productive capacity, and with the rate of
monetary expansion unchanged, an equal one-shot
increase in the general level of prices.
- , , But So What?
These results show that, within the monetarist
framework, the predictive performance of the money-
price relationship over the past five years is not
sufficient to reject the position that only money
matters for inflation, as a continuing increase in the
general level of prices. This does not say that the
money-price hypothesis is proven true, but only that
some of the often cited evidence does not show it to
be false. As with any hypothesis that has not been
refuted by evidence, acceptance of the money-price
process remains a matter of confidence and is condi-
tional on the results of further testing. Beyond provid-
ing the opportunity for some nose-thumbing to the
critics of monetarist doctrine, however, the argument
and evidence presented here have serious implications.
If, in fact, the domestic price level has been signifi-
cantly and permanently displaced by an autonomous
decrease in wealth, then much of the current debate
about the nature of the inflation, unemployment, and
degree of capacity utilization are misplaced.
Consider the implications of a 4.5 percent increase
in the price level for the productive capacity of the
economy. The argument presented earlier explained
this price increase as a non-recurring wealth effect.
The channel through which this impact is transmitted
is the productive capacity of the economy.8
The autonomous 4.5 percent increase in the price
level in 1974 suggests an approximately equal decrease
in productive capacity. The reasoning should be fairly
obvious, especially in view of much of the work done
on the effects of costs of information and adjustment
on economic activity, especially investment. In a world
where the mix of factors of production is expensive
to change once production processes are put in place,
an unexpected increase in a factor cost (in this case,
energy) renders some portion of vintage capital obso-
lete. The immediate effect is a contraction of produc-
tive capacity. Vested production processes simply can-
not be used profitably at the same rate as had been
consistent with prior expectations about energy prices.
Nothing happens to the productive capacity in an
engineering sense, but the economically efficient rate
of production is slashed.
In the normal course of events such an autonomous
shift in relative factor prices would induce attempts
to alter factor proportions, within the constraints im-
posed by adjustment costs. Other factors, including
labor, would become relatively attractive and the de-
mand for these other factors would increase — rela-
tive to energy. A problem would be expected to rise
quickly, however, since the attention of “labor” will be
directed at the absolute wealth loss they suffered, as
CI ~,tlV
Price Level Implied by
Ex ante Simulation of Equation (1)
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8
The argument presented here is akin to that found in
Edmund S. Phelps, “Stopover Monetarism: Supply and
Demand Factors in the 1972-74 Inflation” (Proceedings of a
Conference on Japan-U.S. Economic Policy, American Enter-
prise Institute, 1975), pp. 51-68. See also A. B. Balbach and
Denis S. Karnosky, “Real Money Balances: A Good Fore-
casting Device and a Good Policy Target?” this Review
(September 1975), pp. 11-15.
A clear statement of the alternative argument that the re-
cession can be explained in terms of a decrease in aggregate
demand induced by the decrease in real income suffered
because of the increase in energy prices is found in Robert
J. Cordon, “Alternative Responses of Policy to External
Supply Shocks,” I3rookings Papers on Economic Activity,
No. 1, 1975, pp. 183-204.
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measured by the rise in the general price level.9 The
situation is further confused by the increased short-
term, structural unemployment caused by the differ-
ential effect of increased energy prices on various seg-
ments of the economy. The actions of labor to resist
absorbing their share of the aggregate wealth loss and
government actions to reduce the burdens of rising un-
employment would retard the factor substitution
process and extend the duration of unemployment.
The end result would be pressure on the stabiliza-
tion authorities to do something to stimulate employ-
ment with aggregate actions. As the price level ad-
justment to the wealth decrease runs its course, the
rate of price change would fall toward the funda-
mental rate of inflation, currently about 5.5 percent
per year, as shown by the results presented here.
However, those analysts with a penchant for the
Phillips-curve framework would view the decelera-
tion of inflation and concurrent high or rising unem-
ployment as reflecting restrictive stabilization ac-
tions.1°The call would be for more concern about
unemployment and less for inflation, that is, stimula-
tive policy.11
This analysis is faulty, in the monetarist view, in
that it misinterprets the economic data. Much of the
decline in production in 1974 was due to the autono-
mous constriction of profitable production ventures.
As such, it was beyond the control of the monetary
authorities. This runs contrary to the analysis that the
recession resulted because the government (that is, the
Federal Reserve) did not increase the money supply
to offset the increase in oil prices. The money-price
hypothesis says that, if anything, the money stock
could be reduced in order to avoid the increase in the
price level, but in no way would monetary actions
have much of a permanent expansionary effect on
output. The economic contraction could be cushioned
temporarily, but at the cost of a permanent increase
in the rate of inflation.
In the same vein, much of the subsequent increase
in unemployment, resulting from the interaction of
9
One area where this would be manifested, albeit indirectly,
is the escalator clauses in labor contracts,
10
For example, the rate of change of prices fell from 11.4
percent in 1974 to 6.0 percent over the first half of 1975.
The rate of unemployment rose from 7.2 percent of the
labor force in December 1974 to 8.9 percent at mid-1975.
~See, for example, U.S. Congress, Hearings Before the Joint
Economic Committee, The 1975 Economic Report of the
Prerident, 94th Congress, 1st Sess., February 5, 6, 7, and
14, 1975, pp. 534-49.
the wealth decrease, adjustment costs, and frustrated
expectations, was not responsive, in any lasting sense,
to stimulative actions of the Federal Reserve. Much
of current unemployment is more of a problem of
the legal infrastructure of the economy than it is
one of deficient aggregate demand. As such, the
problem requires structural change in the form of
easing restrictions on the operation of markets, and
not more money.
The effect of the autonomous shocks of the past few
years on the productive capacity of the economy is
shown in Chart V. The sustainable, long-tenn expan-
sion path for total production in the economy, prior to
the oil embargo, is labelled “Economic Capacity (pre-
embargo).” This is a measure of the production poten-
tial of the economy, in the absence of such factors as
the quadrupling of oil prices and new government
safety, environmental and resource allocation pro-
grams. The analysis presented here suggests that this
rate of production is no longer achievable, without
fundamental change in the structure of the economy
or an ever accelerating inflation. The new productive
capacity is estimated to be 4.5 percent lower, as
shown by the line labelled “Economic Capacity
(post-embargo ) “12 By this measure total product in
the first quarter of this year was 96.2 percent of
capacity, as opposed to 91.9 percent of the old
capacity measure. In other words, the economy is
much closer to full employment than many analysts
claim. For labor, this suggests that the full employ-
lCThis estimate does not incorporate the possibility that the
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went rate of unemployment is much higher, at least
for the next several years, than previously.
Summary
The immediate purpose of this exercise is to pre-
sent an empirical test of the proposition that inflation,
as a continuing increase in the general level of prices,
is everywhere a monetary phenomen. The test is
severe, being based entirely on a rare situation
characterized by the emergence of a large number
of nonmonetary forces which many analysts claim
to have an effect on the rate of inflation, The evi-
dence shows the money-price hypothesis to be un-
scathed. The hypothesis is still refutable, but other
forms of evidence are required.
The analysis implies that current measures of
aggregate capacity utilization overstate the amount of
slack in production that can be taken up through
stimulative monetary and fiscal actions. This means
that the economy will encounter an effective capacity
constraint long before current measures of unem-
ployment and capacity signal the danger. More than
four percent of the productive capacity was de-
stroyed by the events of the past few years. This
potential is restored neither quickly nor cheaply.
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